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Abstract 
In the Controlled Substances Act of 1970, Congress made the conscious decision to vest 
the regulation and control of drugs in two executive branch departments.  The Attorney 
General, through the DEA, is responsible for law enforcement.  The Department of 
Health and Human Services, through the FDA, is responsible for the regulation of all 
commercially available drugs.  This paper presents a brief historical overview of the 
shared regulatory authority over drugs by examining the Controlled Substances Act and 
federal treatment of controlled substances since 1970.  The paper discusses the events 
surrounding the creation of the current structure of regulation, the workings of the 
structure and the criticisms of it, with a focus on the decision by Congress to divide 
authority.  This paper does not endorse specific proposals for change, but rather seeks to 
inform the discussion on the current regulation of drugs and other controlled substances.    3 
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Introduction 
 
In the Controlled Substances Act, Congress made the conscious decision to vest the 
regulation and control of drugs in two executive branch departments.  The Attorney 
General, through the DEA, is responsible for law enforcement.  The Department of 
Health and Human Services, through the FDA, is responsible for the regulation of all 
commercially available drugs.  At times, such as with the scheduling of drugs, the two 
departments are to consult one another, coming to a decision that represents the collective 
thoughts of the two bodies.  At other times, however, the agencies have distinct roles and 
little interaction.  As a result of the differing goals and functions of the two departments, 
some commentators have criticized the system of consultation and shared regulation that 
governs controlled substances.  
 
This paper presents a brief historical overview of the shared regulation of drugs by 
examining the Controlled Substances Act and federal treatment of controlled substances 
since the 1970.  This overview discusses the events surrounding the creation of the 
current structure of regulation, the workings of the structure and the criticisms of it, with 
a focus on the decision by Congress to vest the Attorney General with law enforcement 
authority, subject to the binding input of the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
(“Secretary”).  The paper, however, does not provide recommendations for change.  
Rather, it serves as a point of departure for further commentary in the field.   
   5 
This text proceeds in five parts.  Part I provides a historical background to the Controlled 
Substances Act (CSA).  Part II provides an explanation of the federal regulatory scheme 
for controlled substances.  Part III examines the debate over the current regulatory 
scheme and the roles of DOJ and HHS within it, touching on the origins of the debate as 
well.  Part IV focuses on enforcement of the CSA, highlighting again the tension between 
the roles of the Department of Justice and the Department of Health and Human Services 
in the prosecution of physicians prescribing controlled substances.  Part V examines 
proposals for change to the current regulatory scheme.      
Part I: Historical Background 
Prior to the creation of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), two federal offices had 
control over drug enforcement.
1  The Bureau of Narcotics in the Department of Treasury 
was responsible for the monitoring and control of marijuana and narcotics—drugs 
produced in whole or in part from opium or opiates, poppy straw, coca leaves, and 
cocaine.
2  The Bureau of Drug Abuse Control in the Department of Health, Education 
and Welfare (HEW) was responsible for controlling “dangerous drugs,” including 
depressants, stimulants such as barbiturates and amphetamines, and hallucinogens, such 
as LSD.
3  In response to growing use of illegal drugs in America, President Johnson 
introduced legislation in 1968 to combine the Bureau of Narcotics and the Bureau of 
                                                 
1 Allgov.com, U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), 
http://www.allgov.com/Agency/U_S__Drug_Enforcement_Administration__DEA_(last 
visited April 24, 2009). 
2 See 21 USC 802(17) (2007). for current definition, which was in effect prior to the CSA 
as well.   
3 Id.     6 
Drug Abuse Control into one agency.
4  Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1968, effective 
April 8 of that year, created the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) in 
the Department of Justice (DOJ), which was responsible for preventing illicit traffic in 
narcotic, stimulant, and depressant drugs and controlling the manufacture of those drugs 
for medicinal purposes.
5 
 
In 1969 President Nixon announced that the Attorney General, John N. Mitchell, was 
preparing a comprehensive measure to combine existing federal laws addressing 
narcotics and drugs into a single statute in order to better address the narcotics and drugs 
problems at the federal level.
6  This effort would lead to Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 
1973, which established the DEA in the Department of Justice.
7 
 
In furtherance of creating a unified enforcement policy for controlled substances, 
Congress enacted the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) in 1970 as titles II and III of the 
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970.  The creation of the 
CSA resulted in a comprehensive federal scheme for regulation of controlled substances 
to combat both drug abuse and illegal drug trafficking.  To bolster its position that 
comprehensive action was necessary, Congress made a number of findings relating to 
controlled substances.   One finding in particular stated, “the illegal importation, 
                                                 
4 Allgov.com, supra note 1.    
5 Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1968, 33 F.R. 5611 (1968); Robert Matchette et al., 
Records of the Drug Enforcement Agency, Guide to Federal Records in the National 
Archives of the United States, National Archives and Records Administration (1995) 
http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/170.html. 
6 Matchette, supra.  
7 Id..   7 
manufacture, distribution, possession and improper use of controlled substances have a 
substantial and detrimental effect on the health and general welfare of the American 
people.”
8   
 
President Nixon signed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act into 
law on October 27, 1970.  In his signing statement, President Nixon expressed a deep 
concern about the effects drug use had on crime and the increasing prevalence of drug 
use among teenagers.
9  Known as a proponent of taking a tough stance on drug abuse
10 
after declaring a war on drugs shortly after taking office in 1969,
11 President Nixon, 
interestingly, did not stress DOJ’s predominant role in enforcement.
12  He mentioned 
instead the importance of treatment programs to help the addicted end their dependence.
13  
President Nixon did also highlight the increased jurisdiction of the Attorney General and 
                                                 
8 Emily Farr. Comment, The Medical Necessity Defense as an Exception to the 
Controlled Substances Act. 53 S.C.L.Rev 439, 449 (2002) (quoting 21 U.S.C.A. 801(2) 
(West 2001)).   
9 Richard Nixon. Remarks on Signing the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and 
Control Act of 1970. (October 27, 1970) available at   
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=2767.  
10 President Nixon was very much opposed to legalizing marijuana.  In a meeting with 
Mayor Daley of Chicago in 1971 he remarked, “Now my position is flat-out on that.  I 
am against legalizing marijuana…the point is, once you cross that line, from the straight 
society to the drug society – marijuana, then speed, then it’s LSD, then it’s heroin, etc. 
then you’re done.  We’ve got to take a strong stand.” Ontheissues.com, On The Issues: 
Richard Nixon on Drugs, http://www.ontheissues.org/Celeb/Richard_Nixon_Drugs.htm 
(quoting White House tapes: meeting with Mayor Richard Daley, May 13, 1971) (last 
visited April 24, 2009). 
11 See Gonzales v. Raich. 545 U.S. 1, 10 (2005) (noting in the opinion the historical 
background to the marijuana laws).   
12 Nixon, supra note 9. 
13 Id.   8 
the additional enforcement officers the bill would enable,
14 but not as much as one might 
have anticipated.  
Part II: Federal Oversight Scheme for Controlled 
Substances 
 
The DEA and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) both have a role in enforcing 
federal law pertaining to drugs.  The DEA enforces the CSA, which establishes criminal 
and civil sanctions for the unlawful possession, manufacturing, or distribution of certain 
dangerous substances, including prescription drugs that share these properties.
15  The 
FDA regulates all commercially available drugs for safety and effectiveness under the 
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).   
 
The Attorney General has the authority to add or remove drugs from the schedules of 
controlled substances established by the CSA.  The CSA divided controlled substances 
into 5 schedules, for which differing levels of control are applied.  The substances range 
from Schedule I substances, which are found to have a very high potential for abuse, to 
Schedule 5 substances, which have the lowest potential for abuse of any controlled 
substance and lead to the least physical or psychological dependence of any drug if 
abused.
16  Schedule I substances are those that have no accepted medical use in the 
United States and have a high abuse potential.
17  Examples of schedule I substances are 
                                                 
14 Id.   
15 Jody Feder, Legal Issues Related to Prescription Drug Sales on the Internet. 
Congressional Research Service.  (March 5, 2004). 
http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs-5776:1 
16 21 U.S.C.. §812(b)(1) (2007). 
17  21 U.S.C.A. §812(b)(1)(A) (2007).     9 
heroin, marijuana and other hallucinogenic substances.
18  Schedule II substances are 
considered to have a high abuse potential plus severe psychic or physical dependence 
liability, but to have a currently accepted medical use in treatment in the US or a 
currently accepted medical use with severe restrictions unlike schedule I.
19  Examples of 
Schedule II drugs are opium and opiates, methadone, coca leaves, and any liquid 
substances containing methamphetamine.
20   
 
Drugs and other substances in Schedules III-V all have a currently accepted medical use 
in treatment in the United States and have decreasing potentials for abuse and physical or 
psychological dependence.  Schedule III substances are those that have a potential for 
abuse less than the Schedule I and II drugs and substances, and may lead to moderate or 
low physical dependence or high psychological dependence if abused.  These drugs and 
substances include anabolic steroids, codeine and hydrocodone with aspirin or Tylenol, 
as well as some barbiturates and their derivatives.
21  Schedule IV consists of drugs or 
other substances with a lower potential for abuse than Schedule III and that lead to 
limited physical dependence or psychological dependence if abused, relative to the drugs 
or other substances in schedule III.  This category includes drugs like Valium and Xanax.   
Finally, Schedule V drugs or other substances have a low potential for abuse relative to 
the drugs or substances in Schedule IV, and abuse of the drug or substance may lead to 
limited physical or psychological dependence relative to drugs or other substances in 
                                                 
18 U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, Drugs of Abuse Publication, Chapter 1, 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/abuse/1-csa.htm (last visited April 24, 2009).  
19 21 U.S.C. §812(b)(2)(A) (2007). 
20 U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, supra note 17 
21 Id.    10 
Schedule IV.  Schedule V consists of medications like cough medicines that contain 
codeine.
22     
 
The DEA regulates the manufacture, sale and distribution of controlled substances.  Any 
person who handles or intends to handle controlled substances must obtain a registration 
issued by the DEA,
23 and parties that distribute controlled substances must keep 
extensive records.  For Schedule I and II substances, the supplier must receive a special 
order form from the customer to supply the drug.
24  The special order form contains the 
pre printed address of the customer and is created by the DEA.
25  For drugs in the other 
three schedules no registration form is required, but the supplier is responsible for 
ensuring the purchaser has a valid registration to handle controlled substances.
26   
 
The five schedules of drugs are subject to differing distribution rules.  Schedule I drugs 
are to be used in the US only in research situations.  Schedule II prescription orders must 
be written and signed,
27 Schedule III and IV prescription orders may be oral or written, 
and Schedule V drugs and substances do not require a prescription but do require a 
showing of identification and recordation in a pharmacist’s log.
28  The DEA limits the 
quantities of Schedule I and II substances that may be produced in the US in any given 
                                                 
22 Id.   
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 See  http://www.accessbutler.com/abc/WAButler/ProductsandServices/deaform222.pdf 
for a sample order form. 
26. U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, supra note 17 
26 Id.   
27 Id 
28 Id.     11 
year, but does not do so for the other schedules.  As a result, scheduling decisions are of 
importance to drug manufacturers, users, and the medical practitioners that prescribe 
drugs.     
  
While at first glance it seems that the DEA alone handles scheduling decisions, the FDA, 
and a couple other agencies in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
have input into the scheduling decisions of the Attorney General.  When deciding 
whether to add or remove a drug from the schedule, the Attorney General is required to 
first ask the Secretary of HHS for her recommendation.  The Secretary’s 
recommendations are binding on the Attorney General, insofar as they concern the 
scientific and medical matters relating to the appropriate schedule under which such drug 
or substance should be listed, if any. 
 
The statute provides that,  
The Attorney General shall, before initiating proceedings under subsection 
(a)  to  control  a  drug  or  other  substance  or  to  remove  a  drug  or  other 
substance  entirely  from  the  schedules,  and  after  gathering  the  necessary 
data, request from the Secretary a scientific and medical evaluation, and his 
recommendations, as to whether such drug or other substance should be so 
controlled or removed as a controlled substance.  In making such evaluation 
and  recommendations,  the  Secretary  shall  consider  the  factors  listed  in 
paragraphs (2), (3), (6), (7), and (8) of subsection c and any scientific or 
medical  considerations  involved  in  paragraphs  (1),  (4)  and  (5).  .  .  The 
recommendations of the Secretary to the Attorney General shall be binding 
on the Attorney General as to such scientific and medical matters, and if the   12 
Secretary recommends that a drug or other substance not be controlled, the 
Attorney General shall not control the drug or other substance.
29 
 
The Secretary mentioned in the above section of the statute is the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services—the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare in the original bill.  
The factors listed in paragraphs (2), (3), (6), (7) and (8) to be considered are: scientific 
evidence of a drug’s pharmacological effect; if known, the state of current scientific 
knowledge regarding the drug; what risks the drug poses to public health; the psychic or 
physiological dependence liability; and whether the substance is an immediate precursor 
of a substance already controlled under the title.
30   
 
The DEA or HHS, or any interested person through petition, may initiate proceedings to 
add, delete or change the schedule of a drug or other substance.  Interested persons 
include “the manufacturer of a drug, a medical society or association, a pharmacy 
association, a public interest group concerned with drug abuse, a state or local 
government agency, or an individual citizen.”
31  When the DEA receives a petition, it 
begins its investigation of the drug.
32  The DEA may also begin an investigation into a 
drug at any time based upon information it receives from government laboratories, local 
and state law enforcement and regulatory agencies, or other sources of information.
33 
 
                                                 
29 21 U.S.C. 811(b) (2007). 
30 21 U.S.C. 811(c) (2007).   
31 Drug Enforcement Agency, supra note 17. 
32 Id.   
33 Id.     13 
In practice the DEA administrator does much of the administrative work around 
scheduling that is statutorily delegated to the Attorney General by the CSA.  The 
Department of Justice describes the process as the following,  
Once the DEA has collected the necessary data, the DEA Administrator, by 
authority of the Attorney General, requests from the Department of Health 
and  Human  Services  a  scientific  and  medical  evaluation  and 
recommendation  as  to  whether  the  drug  or  other  substance  should  be 
controlled or removed from control.  This request is sent to the Assistant 
Secretary  of  Health  for  HHS.    HHS  solicits  information  from  the 
Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), evaluations and 
recommendations  from  the  National  Institute  on  Drug  Abuse,  and  on 
occasion from the scientific and medical community at large.  The Assistant 
Secretary,  by  authority  of  the  Secretary  compiles  the  information  and 
transmits back to the DEA a medical and scientific evaluation regarding the 
drug or other substance, a recommendation as to whether the drug should be 
controlled, and in what schedule it should be placed.
34   
 
Any additions, deletions or changes made by the DEA to the schedules must be made 
pursuant to the notice and comment rulemaking procedures set forth in Title 5 Chapter 5 
of the US code.
35  However, the statute exempts the Attorney General from conducting 
the findings necessary to schedule a drug or substance and observing the notice and 
comment proceedings if he or she is placing an immediate precursor in the same schedule 
                                                 
34 Id.   
35 See 5 U.S.C. 553 (2001).   14 
the controlled substance of which it is an immediate precursor is already in or in any 
schedule with a higher numerical designation.
36  
 
As noted above, aside from the exception for treatment of precursors, the FDA and the 
National Institute on Drug Abuse give their input into the scheduling of drugs, which is 
made binding on the Attorney General.  The FDA has other roles related to the regulation 
of controlled substances as well.  The agency also monitors the abuse potential of drugs.  
Pursuant to the statute “if, at the time a new-drug application is submitted to the Secretary 
for any drug having a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central 
nervous system, it appears that such drug has an abuse potential, such information shall 
be forwarded by the Secretary [of HHS] to the Attorney General.”
37  As discussed above, 
HHS may initiate proceedings to add, delete or change the schedule of a drug or other 
substance.  The FDA—the agency tasked with reviewing and deciding upon all new drug 
applications—has a primary role in suggesting whether a drug or substance for which a 
new drug application has been filed should be added to the list of controlled substances.   
 
The Attorney General also defers to the FDA and the FDCA with respect to over the 
counter drugs.  He is instructed to promulgate regulations excluding from the application 
of the CSA any non-narcotic drug that contains a controlled substance if the drug may, 
under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act be lawfully sold over the counter without a 
prescription.
38  The Attorney General may promulgate a regulation exempting any 
                                                 
36 21 U.S.C. §811(e) (2007). 
37 21 U.S.C. §811(f) (2007).  
38 21 U.S.C. §811(g) (2007).   15 
compound, mixture, or preparation containing a controlled substance that contains an 
anabolic steroid if the Secretary of HHS makes such a recommendation.
39   
The federal scheme regulating controlled substances thus grants the Attorney General, 
acting through the DEA, and HHS, acting through the FDA and other agencies, 
competency to address the monitoring and regulation of controlled substances.  Though it 
has been in existence for almost 40 years, this system in which the law enforcement 
agency enforces the law subject to the binding input of the medical and public health 
agency has drawn criticism from multiple sides, as detailed below.  To understand the 
criticism, it helps to understand why Congress gave the HHS input into scheduling and 
where the desire for a balance between enforcement and medical and scientific decision-
making originates.  The first step will be to look to the debates in Congress.      
Part III: Congressional Debates over the Cross 
Competencies of DEA and HHS 
 
In the findings and declarations section of the CSA, Congress stated that many of the 
drugs included within the “title have a useful and legitimate medical purpose and are 
necessary to maintain the health and general welfare of the American people.”
40  Despite 
the useful purposes of many of the listed drugs, “illegal importation, manufacture, 
distribution, and possession and improper use of controlled substances” were held to have 
a “substantial and detrimental effect on the health and general welfare of the American 
people.”
41  As a result, federal control of the intrastate and interstate manufacture and 
distribution of controlled substances was necessary.  Given the legitimate medical 
                                                 
39 Id. 
40 21 U.S.C. §801(1) (2007). 
41 21 U.S.C. §801(2) (2007).   16 
purpose of many of the drugs included on the list, debate has been ongoing as to how 
much of the approach to drugs and other controlled substances should be focused on 
enforcement and how much should be focused on prevention, rehabilitation and 
treatment.   
 
A quick glance at the schedules of controlled substances reveals that some very 
recognizable and commonly prescribed substances can be found on the lists.  The drug 
Xanax is commonly prescribed for the treatment of anxiety and panic disorders.
42  
Valium is used for a number of purposes including the treatment of anxiety, acute alcohol 
withdrawal, and seizures.
43  It is also used to relieve muscle spasms and provide sedation 
before medical procedures.
44  Both of these commonly prescribed drugs are listed as 
schedule IV substances on the CSA’s schedules.  A schedule III substance that is 
commonly prescribed is hydrocodone, which is the main ingredient in the drugs Vicodin, 
Lortab and Lorcet.
45  Hydrocodone is a cough suppressant and analgesic used for 
treatment of moderate to moderately severe pain, and studies have indicated that it is as 
effective or more effective than codeine for cough suppression and nearly as powerful as 
morphine in managing pain.
46  Congress understood the importance of drugs such as 
these in the maintenance of the health and welfare of the American people and did not 
                                                 
42 First DataBank, Inc., Xanax (Alprazolam) Drug Information, 
http://www.rxlist.com/xanax-drug.htm (last viaited April 24, 2009). 
43 Rxlist.com, Valium (Diazepam Tablets) Drug Information. 
http://www.rxlist.com/valium-drug.htm (last visited April 24, 2009). 
44 Id. 
45U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, Drug Information, Hydrocodone 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/concern/hydrocodone.html (last visited April 24, 2009). 
46 Id.     17 
intend to deprive medical practitioners and patients in need of these useful substances.  
Their use, however, was to be balanced with the need for enforcement.   
 
During the consideration of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act 
(CDAPCA), a debate arose related to whether the Act should stress the importance of 
stronger law enforcement or should note Congress’ desire to use educational and 
rehabilitative measures to address the use and abuse of controlled substances.  The debate 
on the Senate floor of Amendment 1026 proposed by Iowa Senator Harold Hughes 
provided a good example of the tension between enforcement and rehabilitation.  Senator 
Roman Hruska in his statement before the floor on the Act described it as a measure “that 
would go very extensively into the field of rehabilitation, education, prevention, and 
matters of that kind.”
47  He argued that adding the amendment to the Act would “impair 
many of the law enforcement features contained in Title II of the bill.
48 Senator Hruska 
and others were further concerned that in the congressional findings of the amendment 
one finding stated that drug dependence is an illness or disease.  In their view, such a 
statement could lead to the use of drug dependence as an affirmative defense to criminal 
prosecution.
49  This would be problematic in a bill geared toward law enforcement.   
 
Another provision in the Hughes amendment that Senator Hruska and others were 
concerned about was the authority granted to the Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare to classify substances.  Senator Hruska argued that the use of the word 
                                                 
47 116 CONG. REC. S17395 (daily edition Oct, 7, 1970) (statement of Sen. Hruska on 
Amendment 1026). 
48 Id.   
49 Id.    18 
“classification” in section 112(k) of the amendment implicitly authorized the Secretary of 
HEW to classify controlled substances for rehabilitation and treatment purposes.
50  
Conferring upon HEW the ability to classify would lead to a duplication of that activity, 
according to Senator Hruska, and would only create conflicts for the investigators and 
prosecutors important to the enforcement of the law.
51  What was needed immediately 
was a “strict and very effective law enforcement program.”
52  Once that was 
accomplished consideration could be made of the need for prevention, treatment and 
rehabilitation measures.
53   
 
Senator Dodd shared Senator Hruska’s views, similarly declaring his concerns about the 
amendment.  He argued that it was a mistake to add to the CSA rehabilitation, research 
and education and information aspects of the matter.
54  Further, he remarked that doing so 
“will hamper the enforcement of this good narcotics law which we can pass.”
55    
 
The Hughes amendment failed, but the debate would come up again.  In December of 
1970 after the CDAPCA had been signed into law, the International Protocol on 
Psychotropic Substances was brought before the Senate for a vote.  The Protocol is a 
treaty of the United Nations that was designed to combat the increased use of 
psychotropic substances, such as amphetamines and barbiturates, by creating a regulatory 
framework that included scheduling and controlling these drugs.  Debate on the protocol 
                                                 
50 Id.   
51 Id.   
52 Id. 
53 Id.   
54 116 CONG. REC S.17377 (daily edition Oct. 7, 1970) (remarks of Sen. Dodd). 
55 Id.     19 
presented another opportunity for discussion of rehabilitation and enforcement in the 
federal approach to controlled substances.  Senator Hughes, the chair of the special 
subcommittee on alcoholism and narcotics explicitly addressed the prior debate on the 
issue.  Hughes stated the following: 
 
One of the most basic issues—to my mind the most basic issue—to come up 
when the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 
was  being  considered  had  to  do  with  the  relative  responsibilities  of  the 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare and the Department of Justice 
over  the  scheduling  of  drugs  for  control  purposes.    The  original 
administration bill indicated that control responsibilities lay with Justice and 
that HEW could give Justice their views, but that the Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare views were in no way binding.  The compromise 
bill,  however,  changed  this  so  that  while  Justice  still  had  the  ultimate 
decisionmaking  authority  as  to  control,  scientific  and  medical 
determinations were made by HEW and these latter determinations were 
made binding upon Justice.
56    
 
The Nixon administration’s initial proposal gave the Department of Justice full 
responsibility to schedule controlled substances.  Senator Hughes worried in his 
testimony that the executive branch was holding to its initial position and extending it to 
                                                 
56 116 CONG. REC S20849 (daily edition Dec. 19, 1970) (Sen. Hughes remarks).   20 
the international realm.
57  Under the draft protocol of the International Protocol on 
Psychotropic Substances, the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs—the UN’s 
drug enforcement policy arm—was to amend the schedules from time to time after 
considering the views of the World Health Organization, but the views of the WHO were 
not to be binding.
58  Although Senator Hughes’ statements related to an international 
proposal, a primary underlying issue, the scheduling of controlled substances, remained 
the same.  The fact that Senator Hughes expressed his concerns about the balance 
between enforcement and scientific knowledge and study shows that the debate over how 
much enforcement should occur without medical input was ongoing.
59   
 
Senators Hughes continued his testimony with more concerns about the level of health 
and science input that would enter law enforcement decisions, directly addressing the 
debate over the Controlled Substances Act.   
 
As  you  know,  Mr.  President,  when  the  Comprehensive  Drug  Abuse 
Prevention and Control Act of 1970 was being discussed and debated, there 
were  a  number  of  other  issues  like  the  specific  one  which  I  have  just 
mentioned which arose and which involved aspects of this larger question of 
the relative health and scientific input and involvement on the one hand, and 
law enforcement input on the other.  I am equally concerned about those 
issues as well—issues which involved such matters as control of research, 
confidentiality of patient records, confidentiality for research subjects, and 
                                                 
57 Id.   
58 Id. 
59 See 116 CONG. REC S20849 (daily edition Dec. 19, 1970) (Sen. Hughes remarks).   21 
maximum  permissible  freedom  for  doctors  and  researchers  to  use 
therapeutic  drugs  with  only  reasonable  interference  by  enforcement 
personnel.
60 
 
Senator Hughes’s concern about the role enforcement would play in the ability of doctors 
to use therapeutic drugs has become a major issue, as illustrated in the discussion below.   
Part IV: Enforcement of the CSA  
A. Law Enforcement Post CSA passage  
 
In 1971, President Nixon commissioned the National Commission on Marijuana and 
Drug Abuse and appointed Robert Shafer, a former Governor of Pennsylvania to head the 
commission.
61  Known as the Shafer Commission, the commission was comprised of four 
members of Congress and nine members of the public—practitioners in fields ranging 
from the medicine to public broadcasting—and issued reports in 1972 and 1973.
62  No 
more than five of the public members could be from the same political party.   
 
The commission presented empirical data and made a number of recommendations to the 
President and Congress regarding suggested responses to marijuana use in the United 
States.  The commission recommended that, “possession for personal use in private and 
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casual not-for-profit sales in private not be made criminal offenses.”
63  Shafer stated in 
his testimony before Congress that the commission “unanimously agreed that [marijuana] 
use is not a desirable behavior and . . . that society should discourage use.  Nevertheless . 
. . placed in proper perspective with other societal problems, citizens should not be 
criminalized or jailed merely for private possession or use.” 
64 The commission further 
concluded that “the criminal law is too harsh a tool to apply to personal possession even 
in the effort to discourage use . . . . The actual and potential harm of the use of the drug is 
not great enough to justify intrusion by the criminal law into private behavior, a step 
which our society takes with greatest reluctance.”
65   
 
The commission’s recommendations included medical recommendations for the 
government’s approach to marijuana.  It recommended that there be increased support of 
studies that evaluate the efficacy of marijuana in the treatment of physical impairments 
and disease.  The promotion of community-based treatment facilities was also 
recommended to assist in caring for problem drug users, which would allow utilization of 
existing health centers when possible and appropriate.
66 
 
President Nixon was not satisfied with the report and reportedly refused to read it.
67  
Thus, the Nixon administration ignored the report’s findings and decided to pursue its 
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drug enforcement policy,
68 creating the DEA in 1973 and consolidating enforcement 
within it.     
 
Since the CSA’s passage in 1970 there have been three amendments to the bill, but the 
general enforcement scheme has stayed substantially the same.  The CSA was amended 
in 1978 to meet obligations under the Convention on Psychotropic Substances.  The 1978 
amendment added to the classification and scheduling procedure a provision enabling 
communication with the WHO related to the international scheduling of controlled 
substances, to provide for consistency between the US controlled substances schedules 
and the Convention on Psychotropic Substances schedules.
69  The 1984 amendment 
specified penalties for manufacture, use or distribution of controlled substances and 
updated provisions regarding compounds.
70  The 2004 amendments added to the 
definition of and penalty treatment for anabolic steroids.
71            
B. Litigation over the CSA 
 
Pursuant to the CSA, enforcement of drug laws has remained the province of the DEA, 
while HHS has acted to provide scientific input related to controlled substances and has 
regulated and monitored the practice of medicine.  Though DOJ and HHS have worked 
together on the sharing of information on and the scheduling of drugs and other 
controlled substances, there have been points of tension.  One particular point of tension 
is illuminated by the controversy over the DOJ’s regulation of physician authorization to 
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distribute drugs.  The question of the proper role of DOJ in the enforcement of medical 
decisions was at the forefront in Gonzales v. Oregon.
72 
 
In Gonzales, a directive issued by the Attorney General was the basis for the legal 
controversy.  Attorney General John Ashcroft had issued a directive advising doctors in 
Oregon that they would be subject to deregistration and criminal prosecution if they were 
to use controlled substances to carry out Oregon’s death-with-dignity law.
73  Oregon’s 
death-with-dignity law was enacted in 1994 by Oregon voters and allows Oregon 
residents to request a diagnosis from their “attending physician that they have an 
incurable and irreversible disease, that within reasonable medical judgment, will cause 
death within six months.”
74  After receipt of the request, the requesting patient is required 
to obtain a determination by the attending physician that the request was made 
voluntarily and secure confirmation of the attending physician’s diagnosis by a second 
consulting physician.  Only at that point can the attending physician dispense or issue a 
prescription for the requested drug, but not administer it.
75  The drugs that physicians 
prescribed and dispensed to hasten death are controlled substances, which subjects them 
to the requirements of the CSA.   
 
The CSA imposes strict, mandatory registration requirements for physicians seeking to 
dispense or prescribe controlled substances.  A medical practitioner is required to register 
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with the Attorney General and obtain a certificate of registration with the DEA if she 
intends to prescribe or dispense a controlled substance.
76  One of the amendments made 
to the CSA in the 1984 bill authorized the Attorney General to deny a practitioner’s 
application for DEA registration if the Attorney General determined that the issuance of 
such registration would be inconsistent with the public interest.
77  Relevant to Gonzales, 
the DEA Administrator found that assisting suicide is not a legitimate medical purpose 
and that prescribing, dispensing or administering federally controlled substances to assist 
suicide violates the CSA.
78  Such conduct by a physician registered to dispense controlled 
substances could render his registration inconsistent with the public interest and subject 
him to the suspension or revocation of his registration.
79     
 
Although prior Attorney General Janet Reno determined that the DEA could not 
prosecute or revoke CSA registration of Oregon physicians who assisted suicide because 
the CSA did not authorize the DEA to replace the states as primary regulators of the 
medical profession, Attorney General John Ashcroft’s administration overturned this 
determination.  Attorney General Ashcroft determined that assisting suicide was not a 
“legitimate medical purpose within the meaning of 21 CFR §1306.04, and that 
prescribing, dispensing, or administering federally controlled substances to assist suicide 
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violates the CSA.”
80  The Attorney General found that this conclusion holds even if state 
law authorizes or permits such conduct by practitioners or others.
81  
 
The Supreme Court rejected Attorney General Ashcroft’s assertion in Gonzales and 
found that he did not have authority under the CSA to preempt Oregon’s death-with-
dignity law.  The Court held that the CSA “allocates decisionmaking powers among 
statutory actors so that medical judgments . . . are placed in the hands of the Secretary.”
82  
Further, in the CSA’s provisions on regulation of medical practice with respect to drug 
rehabilitation, the Secretary determines the appropriate methods of professional practice 
in medical treatment of narcotic addiction, after consultation with the Attorney General.
83  
The Court additionally references the Congressional record for the statement that 
Congress intended for all decisions of a medical nature to be made by the Secretary, 
whereas the Attorney General would make all decisions “respecting the security of stocks 
of narcotic drugs and the maintenance of records on such drugs.”
84       
 
One important element of the Supreme Court’s decision was that the Attorney General 
did not have the authority to regulate the practice of medicine.  The Court found from 
looking through the Congressional Record that the congressional intent in creating the 
CSA and adopting the statutory provisions related to physician prescribing and 
dispensing controlled substances was to allow the DEA to enforce drug law to the extent 
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that enforcement did not interfere with the practice of medicine.  Congress intended that 
the Secretary of HHS make all decisions that were medical in nature. 
 
As is seen by the testimony of some of the Senators who debated and passed the CSA, 
giving the Secretary input into medical and health decisions was of great importance to 
Congress.  Though some senators objected to adding preventive, rehabilitative and 
treatment-based provisions to the CSA,
85 it was important that the opinions of the health 
professionals in the health policy and regulatory agency of the federal government 
influenced enforcement policy.  From the binding nature of HHS’s input into scheduling 
decisions to HHS’s regulation of practice for physicians prescribing controlled 
substances, it was to be the agency with primary competence.  
 
That said, in the event of violation of the Controlled Substances Act, even if by a 
practicing physician, the Court has affirmed the statutory authority of DEA to enforce the 
CSA’s punishments.  In US v. Moore the Supreme Court interpreted the CSA to 
criminalize the misuse of controlled substances.
86  Dr. Moore had acted improperly in the 
prescription and disbursement of controlled substances.  He had failed to give adequate 
examinations, provided drugs as frequently and in quantities as great as the patient 
desired, and charged fees based on the amount of drugs prescribed.
87   
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The Court said that because Dr. Moore’s conduct exceeded the bounds of professional 
conduct he could be criminally prosecuted.
88  Dr. Moore argued that he could not be 
prosecuted because his conduct was authorized by the CSA, but the Court was not 
persuaded.  Dr. Moore had only a valid registration to dispense methadone for 
detoxification purposes,
89 but had acted as a “large scale pusher” in the eyes of the Court, 
dispensing methadone for more than just detoxification.
90  Congress in enacting the CSA 
was concerned that drug laws not impede legitimate research and physicians be allowed 
reasonable discretion in treating patients.
91  As a result, it gave the Secretary the task of 
determining the appropriate methods of professional practice in medical treatment of 
narcotic addiction.
92  This also means, however, that physicians who go beyond the 
approved practices are subject to serious criminal penalties.
93        
 
The Supreme Court approved of DEA enforcement of the CSA against consumers of 
controlled substances in Gonzales v. Raich.  California’s Compassionate Use Act 
authorizes doctors to prescribe a limited amount of marijuana for medicinal purposes.
94  
The plaintiffs in the case, Ms. Raich and Ms. Monson, were California residents who 
suffered from serious medical conditions and used marijuana as medication pursuant to 
recommendations from their respective doctors.
95  Ms. Monson cultivated marijuana, a 
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schedule I drug, until federal DEA agents came to her house and destroyed her six 
cannabis plants.
96     
 
The plaintiffs argued that enforcing the CSA against them would violate the Commerce 
Clause, the Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, 
but the Court found that the CSA could properly be enforced against them.
97  The Court 
found that a primary purpose of the CSA is to control the supply of controlled substances 
in both lawful and unlawful markets.
98  The regulation of the production of marijuana for 
home consumption has a substantial impact of the supply and demand for marijuana in 
interstate commerce and is within Congress’ commerce power.
99  Thus, locally cultivated 
marijuana is properly subject to federal regulation and prohibition by the CSA.
100  
Further, the CSA would impose controls beyond those of California law, including 
requiring a provider to obtain federal approval before marijuana could be dispensed.
101 
 
Though the Supreme Court prevented the enforcement of the CSA against doctors in 
Oregon, it showed in Moore and Raich that where the CSA is being expressly violated, 
whether by physician or consumer, federal controlled substances laws will be enforced.  
It is not difficult to see that the line between enforcement of violation of the CSA and 
control over the practice of medicine is quite blurry, however.  The Attorney General 
does not have the authority to regulate the practice of medicine, and medical judgments 
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are left to HHS, but where medical judgments have been made and rules have been 
adopted implementing them, the Attorney General has the authority to enforce the law 
and prosecute medical practitioners.  Given the blurriness of this line, calls have been 
made to reform this system of shared authority.    
Part V: Calls For Reform 
A. Recent Legislative Action 
 
Though Congress has settled parts of the debate as to how much authority the Attorney 
General should have over matters related to the practice of medicine, for some the debate 
is ongoing.  Critics of parts of the statutory scheme see a need for change of the 
regulatory scheme as it is.  One of the most recent proposals for change to the current 
balance between the Attorney General and HHS came in the form of legislation proposed 
in 2005. 
  
Virginia representative Frank R. Wolf introduced legislation in 2004 proposing that the 
DEA be given authority to review, and potentially block, the sale of all new prescription 
narcotics.
102  The legislation was attached to an omnibus appropriations bill, and passed 
with little notice during the 2004 session.
103  In 2005, when the bill was to be renewed, 
the FDA, a number of drug makers, and doctors who treat patients for pain objected to 
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renewing the provision.
104  Representative Wolf’s legislation was subsequently stripped 
from the bill.   
 
Opponents of the provision argued that it was an “unwarranted intrusion by a law 
enforcement agency into the FDA’s drug review process.”
105  Pain specialists opposed to 
the bill argued that DEA reviews of new prescription drugs “could jeopardize the 
development of new drugs needed by patients with chronic pain.”
106  Congressman 
Wolf’s office commented that in declining to renew the provision, Congress “missed an 
opportunity to better control the sale of powerful new narcotic painkillers.”
107  
 
The dispute over the Wolf provision is another chapter in the debate over the role the 
DEA should play in the regulation of medical practice and handling scientific 
information.  In this situation, the focus is on new prescription drugs.  As part of its 
enforcement regime, the DEA has with increased frequency arrested doctors, 
pharmacists, and other health-care workers accused of negligence or willful diversion in 
dispensing prescription narcotics that were later abused.
108  (An example is the Moore 
case above).  A concern of Congress when it was enacting the CSA was that the threat of 
enforcement would make doctors refuse to treat patients with narcotics addictions.
109  
This threat would also deter doctors from conducting research into and experimenting 
with new treatments for narcotics addicts.  Such deterrence would be detrimental to the 
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public health because narcotics addicts would not get the treatment they needed at all or 
would not have access to new and more effective treatments being developed by medical 
professionals.   
 
The FDA, drug makers and doctors were all concerned about Representative Wolf’s bill 
because of the effect it could have on the practice of medicine.  The Wolf bill gave to the 
DEA a function that was previously, and now currently, statutorily assigned to HHS and 
administered by the FDA.  Not only does the bill take power away from the FDA, it 
weighs the need for enforcement over the need for medical study, treatment and 
rehabilitation.  While it does have investigatory functions, the DEA’s primary concern is 
to enforce the law relating to narcotics.  With enforcement as the primary goal, concerns 
over the potential for abuse of a drug might be given too much weight where a new 
narcotic could be a promising tool in the treatment of addiction or the management of 
pain.   
 
Congressman Wolf’s office was primarily concerned with control of the sale of new 
painkillers, which is an important concern.  It is not hard to find stories about people who 
have become addicted to painkillers after being prescribed them to deal with pain 
associated with a surgery or a medical condition, and have had a great deal of trouble 
defeating the addiction.  For example, future hall of fame NFL quarterback Brett Favre 
admitted to the public that he became addicted to painkillers after using them to manage 
the pain that arose from successive injuries and surgeries.
110  Abuse of narcotics is a real 
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issue, but many would argue that stemming abuse should not jeopardize the discovery of 
new medical treatments or interfere with the practice of medicine.  Discussion of the bill 
highlights the tension between currents who believe narcotics should be met primarily 
with enforcement and others that feel that baseline decisions on drugs should be left to 
medical practitioners.   
B: Existing Weaknesses in Federal Enforcement 
 
While detractors from the current balance, like Congressman Wolf, argue that the DOJ 
should have authority to review all new drugs, DEA’s critics argue that it already has a 
less than effective enforcement program.  In 2005 DEA agents seized a total of $1.4 
billion in illegal drug trade related assets and $477 million worth of drugs according to a 
DEA produced publication highlighting their year 2005 accomplishments.
111  These large 
numbers appear to indicate that the DEA has management of the illegal drug trade well 
under control.  According to statistics from the White House Office of Drug Control 
Policy, however, the total value of all drugs sold in the US is as much as $64 billion a 
year.
112  Given the comparatively small volume of drugs that the DEA seizes, some 
critics argue that the DEA’s programs do not effectively deal with the drug problem.   
 
Others argue that for the gains that the DEA makes in its seizure of drugs and 
enforcement of drug law, there are greater burdens placed on local law enforcement 
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officials.
113  The argument asserts that local law enforcement is increasingly burdened 
because higher prices will be charged for drugs to compensate for the increased risk of 
having the drugs seized, which will lead to increased crime by addicts trying to secure 
more money to pay the higher prices.
114  Thus, the gains in the amount of illegal drugs 
seized really should be offset by the greater attention law enforcement will have to devote 
to street crime.   
 
These two criticisms relate mainly to the DEA’s handling of narcotics that enter into the 
US from abroad while discussions above have touched on the DEA’s enforcement of 
laws related to narcotics manufactured here in the US.  The DEA’s role in the scheduling 
of substances and the monitoring of controlled substances manufactured and distributed 
in the US is closely related to its role in stopping the flow of controlled substances that 
enter the US without regard for the intricate scheme regulating these substances.  The 
DEA spends a good amount of its time and budget on seizing illegal drugs and stopping 
the flow of unregulated drugs such that if there were less input by HHS into scheduling or 
DEA was tasked with direct review of new drugs, resource constraints might prevent it 
from effectively conducting its current duties.   
 
One might think that given the questions as to the DEA’s effectiveness, HHS, perhaps 
FDA in particular, should be given more input or control in regulation.  It appears that the 
FDA’s regulation of legal drugs is not without its flaws either, however.  In looking at 
one of its functions, monitoring of and decision-making related to postmarket drugs, the 
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Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that the FDA has some notable 
shortcomings.
115  The FDA struggles in postmarket monitoring because it does not have 
authority in many cases to require postmarket studies from drug sponsors, does not have 
the resources to partner in conducting clinical trials or conduct its own, and the adverse 
events reporting system it uses has limits because of its inability to accurately measure 
frequency of events.
116  These data constraints have contributed to FDA’s shortcomings.  
Moreso they have lead to controversy and in at least one case the pulling of a drug from 
the market.  Perhaps in light of this reality and the FDA’s struggle to monitor prescription 
drugs currently on the market, HHS cannot afford to take on responsibilities that will 
further constrain its resources.     
Conclusion 
 
This paper has presented a brief overview of the history of the Controlled Substances Act 
and the federal regulatory scheme for controlled substances.  It has detailed the split of 
authority that exists between the Department of Justice and the Department of Health and 
Human Services in the regulation of these substances, the reasons for the shared 
responsibility, and the tensions that arise between the competing goals of enforcement 
and physician and scientist control over the practice of medicine.  Though critics of the 
regulatory system argue for reform, this paper has not endorsed any of the proposals for 
change that are being discussed in the public sphere.  Instead, the goal of this paper is to 
present the situation as it is and remind us of how we got here as we think about change.  
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Perhaps this reminder will be helpful in thinking about how to balance competing goals 
of enforcement and protecting the full practice of medicine in the future.     
 